Randolph Land & Livestock Co. et al v. United States of America et al : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Randolph Land & Livestock Co. et al v. United
States of America et al : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
McKay, Burton, McMillan & Richards; Paul E. Reimann; Milton A. Oman; Attorneys for Objectors
and Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Randolph Land & Livestock Co. v. US, No. 7983 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1961
RECEIVf 
APR 12 1 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
IN THE ~lATTER OF THE GENERAL 
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO 
THE USE OF WATER OF BEAR 
RIVER DRAINAGE AREA IN RICH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. ' 
RANDOLPH LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, a corporation, DESERET 
LIVESTOCK CO:JIP ANY, a corporation, 
BOUNTIFUL LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
a corporation, HAROLD SELMAN, NICK 
CHOURNOS, ORVAL JOHNSON, and 
WILLIAM JOHNSON, 
Objector and Appellants, 
-vs.-
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Water Claimant and Respondent, 
THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, Respondent. 
No. 7983 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN 
& RICHARDS, 
PAUL E. REI~IANN, and 
MILTON A. OMAN, 
Attorneys for Objectors and 
Appellants. 
LAW UIT~\AA 
U. of U. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
STATEMENT 0 FFACT .............................. 4-25 
(a) The claims filed by the United States of America... 5 
(b) The Proposed Determination of Water Rights ...... 6-7 
(c) Objections to the Proposed Determination ........ 7-12 
(d) Oral motion to strike the government claims .... 13-15 
(e) Stipulation of facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-19 
(f) Declared purpose of each application ............ 19-20 
(g) Waiver of priority of claims ...................... 20 
(h) Memorandum decision ........................ 21-22 
(i) Findings of fact, conclusions of law and interlocutory 
decree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-24 
POINTS ON WHICH APPELLANTS RELY FOR REVERSAL 
OF THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE . . . . . . . . . . . . 25-28 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28-70 
Point No. 1: A proceeding for the complete adjudication of 
rights to the use of water of a river system under Sec-
tions 100-4-12 and 15, U.C.A. 1943, is a proceeding for 
the determination of the present rights to the use of the 
waters of the river system, not what those rights might 
have been some years ago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28-36 
Point No. 2: In a general water adjudication case, the objec-
tion by a known water user to the State Engineer's 
proposed allowance of certain water clatins by a land-
owner who has never used the water and who does not 
presently make any beneficial use of the water, does 
not constitute a collateral attack upon some prior pro-
ceeding before the State Engineer, but a direct attack 
upon the claim that such claimant presently has a right 
to the use of the water ........................... 36-40 
Point No. 3: Neither the United States of America nor any 
other landowner on whose land water arises, can ac-
quire diligence rights to the use of water for livestock 
upon such land, when the only beneficial use of water 
was made by livestock owners and operators other than 
the landowner, and which livestock operators neither 
operated under permission of or agreement with the 
landowner or in subordination to the landowner ... 40-51 
Point No.4: Where the livestock operators who actually made 
the beneficial use of the water (or their successors in 
interest), have acquired diligence rights to the use of 
the water1 the landowner who never used the water 
and had no interest in such livestock cannot claim dili-
gence rights predicated upon such use made exclusively 
by other when there was no privity whatsoever ..... 51-55 
Point No. 5: The stipulation of facts in this case shows con-
clusively that the United States of America never ac-
quired any diligence rights to the use of water, and 
that the diligence rights claims which the State Engi-
neer proposes to have incorporated into the decree on 
behalf of the United States of America, are void .... 55-59 
Point No. 6: Prior to the 1941 amendment, except for pur-
poses of the Bureau of Reclamation, the United ~tates 
had no authority under the State statutes to file on 
water, and there is no Federal statute which authorizes 
the Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Management 
to make water applications, and consequently such 
applications were and are void .............. : . . . 59-62 
Point No. 7: The stipulation of facts shows that even If there 
had been any authority of the United States of America 
to file applications. to appr?priate wate! in th~s. ~tat.e, 
such applications m question were void ab Initio m 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
view of the fact that the stipulation of facts shows that 
there was no intention on the part of the applicant to 
put the water to beneficial use ................... 62-65 
Point No.8: The declared purpose in each of the applications 
filed by the United States of America is shown to be 
an attempt to preempt the water, to gain a monopoly 
and to control other lands of private citizens and to 
"regulate" the public grazing · lands, and such pur-
poses are for the domination of the property rights of 
others and not for the application of water to bene-
ficial use by the landowner or applicant . . . . . . . . . . 65-58 
Point No. 9: The stipulation shows that some of the applica-
tions lapsed or were withdrawn, and that where certi-
ficates of appropriation were issued such proof was false 
and that no water has ever been put to beneficial use, 
so that there are no existing rights to the use of water 
and no beneficial use of water being made upon which 
any adjudication could be made in favor of the United 
States of America .............................. 68-70 
TABLE OF CASES 
Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 
1, 72 P. 2d 648 ..................................... 58 
Board of Directors, etc. v. Jorgensen, 136 P. 2d 461 ......... 46-47 
Hague v. Nephi Irrigation Co., 16 Ptah 421, 52 P. 765, 41 
L.R.A. 311 ........................................ 49 
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82, 81 L. Ed. 525. 57 S. Ct. 412 ...... 47-48 
Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah at 
82, 166 P. at 311 ............................... ·. 49-50 
Robinson v. Schoenfelt, 62 Utah 233, 218 P. 1041 ........ 49-50 
Smith v. District Court, 69 Utah 493, 256 P. 539 .......... 30-31 
Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 112 ............ 51-52 
Twin Falls Salmon River Land, etc. ·v. Caldwell, 272 F. 356 .. 45 
United States v. Union Gap Irrigation Co., 209 F. 274 ...... 47 
United States v. West Side Irrigation Co., 230 F. 284 ........ 47 
Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Live-
stock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P. 2d 634 ................ 58 
FEDERAL STATUTES j 
16 U. S. C. A., sec. 590 (4) .............................. 61 
30 U. S. C. A., sec. 51, R. S. 2339, (14 Stat. 253) .......... 43-44 
30 U. S. C. A. sec. 52, R. S. 2340, (26 Stat. 1097) ............ 44 
43 U. S. C. A. sec. 321, (19 Stat. 377) .................. 44-45 
43 U. S. C. A. sec. 372, (32 Stat. 390) .................... 46 
43 U. S. C. A. sec. 383, (32 Stat. 390) ..................... 46 
43 U. S. C. A. sec. 315, 315b ............................ 53 
STATE LAWS 
Constitution of Utah, Article XVI, Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
C. L. Utah 1917, sec. 3451 ................................ 60 
Sec. 100-3-2, R. S. U. 1933 ............................ 57, 60 
Laws of Utah 1941, chap. 40 ............................. 60 
Sec. 100-3-2, U. C. A. 1943, (73-3-2, U. C. A. 1953) ...... 57, 60 
Sec. 100-1-3, U. C. A. 1943, (73-1-3, U. C. A. 1953) ...... 31, 39 
Sec. 100-1-4, U. C. A. 1943, (73-1-4, U. C. A. 1953) ...... 31, 54 
Sec. 100-3-1, U. C. A. 1943, (73-3-1, U. C. A. 1953) .......... 31 
Sec. 100-3-8. U. C. A. 1943, (73-3-8, U. C. A. 1953) ........ 66, 67 
Sec. 100-3-17, U. C. A. 1943, (73-3-17, U. C. A. 1953) ........ 39 
Sec. 100-4-1, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-1, U. C. A. 1953) ...... 29, 30 
Sec. 100-4-3, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-1, U. C. A. 1953) .......... 30 
Sec. 100-4-5, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-5, U. C. A. 1953) ...... 32, 35 
Sec. 100-4-11, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-11, U. C. A. 1953) .. 32, 33, 38 
Sec. 100-4-12, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-12, U. C. A. 1953) ...... 33, 34 
Sec. 100-4-13, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-13, U. C. A. 1953) ........ 34 
Sec. 100-4-14, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-14, U. C. A. 1953) ........ 34 
Sec. 100-4-15, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-15, U. C. A. 1953} ...... 34, 35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ 
~I 
~ 
··i 
• ~ 
!': 
ll 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~ IX THE }.1..:-\TTEH OF THE GEXEHAL 
:: DETER~IIX~-\ TIOX OF RIGHTS TO 
THE r~E OF \YATER OF BEAR 
RIYER DH~-\JXAGE AREA IX RICH 
COrXTY, ST_.--\TE OF rTAH. 
t~ RAXDOLPH L~-\.XD & LIVESTOCK 
CO~fPAXY, a corporation, DESERET 
LIYESTOCK: C01IP ANY, a corporation, 
BOrXTIFrL LIYESTOCIC COThfP AXY, No. 7983 
a corporation, HAROLD SEL:.Lc\.N, NICK 
CHOl~RNOS, ORY~~ JOHKSON, and 
\VILLIA~L JOHXSO:K, 
Objector and Appellants, 
-vs.-
THE ITKITED STATES OF A~fERICA,J 
Water Claimant and Respondent, 
THE STATE ENGIXEER OF THE-
f-;TATE OF rTAH, Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELL~TS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Supre1ne Court of the State of Utah granted an 
appeal from an interlocutory decree entered on February 
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7, 1953, in the District Court of Hid1 County, . ...;tate of 
Utah. By such interlocutory decree appealed from, the 
district court overruled and dismissed the objection;-; filed 
by appellants to the stockwatering "diligence right~·· 
claims, and also the stock watering claims based upon 1 
applications to appropriate water filed by the Forest 
Service and by the Bureau of Land _Management of the 
United States of America, listed on pages 327, :l~\ 361 
and 362 of the State Engineer's ''Proposed Determina-
tion of Water Rights in Bear River, Rich Countr, rtah, 
Drainage Area." (Volume III, Record on Appeal). 
The only rnatters in controversy here, relate to the 
claims of water rights asserted by the r nited States of 
America on behalf of the Forest Service and the Bureau 
of Land Management. The rights of appellants and 
others are not involved in this appeal. ConsPquently, not-
withstanding the voluminous character of the State 
Engineer's "Proposed Determination" (Volume Ill of 
the Record on Appeal), only pages i, ii, 327, 3:2S, :;~D. 361 
and 362 are matenal to this appeal. For the convenience 
of the court, the essential items of pleading, the ~tipula­
tion of facts and other rnatters which would eon;-;titute 
an abstract of the record, are incorporated into the :--;tatP-
ment of F'acts. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 13, l!J-!2, the respondent Stat<> ~ngineer 
filed his original petition for a general adjudication of 
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the rights to the use of the waters of Bear River drainage 
area in Rich County, Utah (R. 1-5). On May 14, 1945, 
an amended petition was filed (R. 6-8). An order was 
, entered for publication of notice to water claimants, Sep-
tember 1, 1948 (R. 9). 
~mne two years after the filing of the original peti-
tion for a general adjudication, the United States Forest 
Service and the Grazing Service (later known as the 
Bureau of Land l\Ianagement) filed in the office of the 
State Engineer, various applieations to appropriate 
water for stockwatering purposes, all of which were 
listed as approved claims in the State Engineer's "Pro-
- posed Determination of \Yater Rights in Bear River, 
Rich County, Utah, Drainage Area," in 1951, pages 327 
and 328. 
On April 2, 1951, after the Proposed Determination 
- ~1ad gone to press, the United States of Ameriea through 
the Forest Service, filed with the State Engineer, "water 
users' claims" numbered 1104 to 1115 inclusive, as "dili-
gence rights" claims for stock watering, based upon the 
alleged use of water in some instances as early as 1865. 
A~ indicated in the Stipulation of facts, not one of those 
claims was based on any alleged use by any agency of the 
Federal government, nor by any officer or agent of the 
United States, but based entirely on the use of water for 
livestock made by various livestock operators who had 
grazed their stock on government-owned lands. Those 
claims were added to the Proposed Determination, as an 
appenqix, pages 361 to 362. 
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The State Engineer by his "Proposed Determination" 
recommended allowance of all of the clain1s therein listed 
' including all of the clain1s filed by the United States of 
America. He further stated (Volume III, page ii): 
"10. This proposal is intended to cover all 
existing rights and those subsisting applications 
initiated in the State Engineer's Office and not , 
perfected at this time within the area described. • 
The rights listed herein which are founded upon ' 
contemplated appropriations of water by reas6n 
of subsisting applications filed in the State En- 1 
gineer's Office, are subject to their inclusion in a 
decree conditioned upon compliance with the 
terms of the applications upon which each respec-
tive conten1plated appropriation is based, and up-
on compliance with the provisions of the Laws of 
the State of Utah relating thereto, and Proof of 
Appropriation being made to the State Engineer 
in compliance with said laws. At the end of the 
five-year period herein-after mentioned, the status 
of said applications shall be reported by the State 
Engineer to the court, at which time the final de-
cree should be 1nade to agree with the records of 
said applications, as shown by the records in the 
State Engineer's Office. Any applications which 
are not perfected at the end of the five-year period 
should be excluded from the decree. 
"11. It is recommended that the rights to the 
use of water within the area covered by this pro-
posal be decreed to the various parties substan-
tially as set forth herein. It is further recom-
Inended that the court retain jurisdiction of this 
case for a period of five years for the purpose of 
making adjustments, correcting errors and for 
such other purposes as time may indicate to the 
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eourt as proper and just. In all matters whatso-
ever pertaining to this detennination and the de-
cree to be rendered, the services and advice of the 
::--itate Engineer are at all ti1nes available to the 
eourt." 
~\fter reeeipt of a eopy of the Proposed Determina-
tion, appellants in 1951 filed the following "Objections 
to the Proposed Detennination of Water Rights in the 
Bear RiYer Drainage of Rich County, Utah, by the State 
Engineer" (R. Yol. II, pages 90-9-t-): 
"Petitioners allege and petition the Court 
as follows: 
I 
•· That they and each of them are owriers of 
ranch and range lands located in the water drain-
age area herein concerned, which lands and the 
forage produced annually thereon are used to feed 
and to graze great numbers of livestock which 
petitioners own and operate; that petitioners also 
graze, in addition to the lands they own and in-
dividually control, the public domain and Forest 
Reserve lands of the United· States of America 
which are located in this drainage area with said 
livestock. That petitioners and their predecessors 
in interest have conducted the said livestock op~ 
er3:tions for a period of time prior to the year 
1900 and continuously since that date. 
II 
"That located upon and coursing through and 
across the above said privately owned, public do-
main and Forest Reserve lands are waters which 
the petitioners and their respective predecessors 
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in interest have used to water said livestock and to 
irrigate certain of their ranch lands for all of the 
above said period of time. 
III 
"That petitioners have each appropriated the 
waters and the rights to the use of waters as the 
State Engineer for the State of Utah sets out in 
his 'proposed determination of water righb' 
which have been filed with the Court in this case, 
and each of the petiitioners now own exelusiYely 
the rights to the use of the waters as proposed 
by the State Engineer in his said proposal, and 
have a continuing need for the use of these water~. 
IV. 
"That the l-:-nited States of America has, ~ince 
the State Engineer's original petition which ini-
tiated this action for a determination of the water 
rights concerned was filed herein, through ib de-
partments of Agriculture and Interior, filed with 
the said State Engineer numerous applications 
and claims for the appropriation and recognized 
use and rights to the use of certain waters a~ listed 
and set out in the said proposed determination 
submitted to this Court by the State Engineer: 
that the said applications are identified in the 
proposal for determination of these water right:-; 
by the State Engineer and at the page of ~aid 
document as follows: 
w.u. 
Application Claim 
No. No. Page Source 
16887 778 327 Well 
20337 993 327 Well 
8 
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16~~1 --·) II ... •h)-.J .... I Ht'~PrYoir 
Hi~ II l(i~ •)·)-,) .... ( Spring 
a-~:38~ 1096 3·>-... I 'Vell 
Hi~~l9 110 '),)-0-1 Spring 
Hi I~~ lSI ').)-0-1 Reservoir 
1liSIS 769 3~7 Spring 
16787 ~~!i '),)-0-1 Reservoir 
16886 771 3:27 Reservoir 
16807 793 ~3:27 Reservoir 
19G:2~ 1018 327 Well 
1()~10 796 ').)-0-' Reservoir 
l~lSI~ 1016 3:27 Well 
16791 790 3:27 Reservoir 
16790 789 327 Reservoir 
17~-±0 ISO 327 Spring 
17:27~ 78~ 3:27 Spring 
172-±1 781 327 Spring 
16786 785 327 Spring 
20077 1098 327 Well 
1()789 788 327 Reservoir 
16806 792 327 Spring 
16808 794 327 R.eservoir 
16882 77:3 327 Reservoir 
16884 775 327 Reservoir 
:21~97 100-± 328 Well 
16809 795 328 Spring 
16883 77-! 328 Spring 
16805 791 328 Spring 
17239 719 328 Spring 
16880 771 328 Spring 
16785 784 328 Spring 
1995-t 1099 328 Vvell 
16885 776 328 Spring 
"rrhat in addition to the above listed applica-
tions for appropriation the United States of 
America has also filed with the State Engineer 
numerous clai1ns to the use of water in the area 
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here involved, which said clain1s are each made as 
a diligence right and for livestock watering pur-
poses. The said claims are listed in the appendix 
of the State Engineer's said proposed determina-
tion at the page and with claim numbers and 
source of water as follows, they having been filed 
after the said proposed determination has been 
submitted to the printer. 
Claim No. Page Sou.rce 
1104 361 Creek 
1105 361 Creek 
1106 l 361 Creek 
1107 361 Stream 
1108 361 Creek 
1109 361 Creek 
1110 361 Creek 
1111 361 Creek 
1112 361 Creek 
1113 362' Creek 
1114 362 Creek ill 
1115 362 Creek 
"That the United States of America has not 
heretofore made any use of the waters included 
in its above said claims and applications·, nor has 
it made any other beneficial use thereof as con-
templated by the laws of the State of Utah; that 
no legislation is pending for the purpose of au-
thorizing the United States of America to own 
or to operate livestock which might make any 
beneficial use of the said waters, nor is there any 
reasonable possibility that the United States of 
America may, in the forseeable future, put said 
waters or any part thereof to any other beneficial 
use. 
10 
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v 
"'That the said applications and claims filed 
bY the enited States of Anlerica conflict with 
right~ to the use of waters held individually by 
petitioners; and a1nount to representations by the 
said applicant that there are waters available sur-
plus to the needs of petitioners or others, whereas 
no such surplus waters exist in said area; that 
such representations on the part of the said appli-
cant serve no useful purpose and tend to cast a 
cloud upon the water rights owned within this 
area by petitioners; that since the United States 
of An1erica has 1nade no beneficial use of said 
waters and is in no position to 1nake such use 
thereof now nor in the foreseeable future, no ap-
propriation of said water can be recognized nor 
granted under governing law and regulations; and 
that the endeavor on the part of the United States 
to assume and take control of the waters de-
scribed in its considerable number of applications 
and claims amounts toan unlawful attempt to 
deny to citizens an opportunity to acquire this 
property. 
VI 
"That the State Engineer proposes in his 
above mentioned proposed determination of the 
water rights in the drainage area herein con-
cerned, to grant'to the Pnited States of America 
a period of five years within which to comply with 
the requirements of law as to the applications 
heretofore listed, and proposes that a final deter-
mination of the water rights in this area be not 
made until the end of said period. 
VII 
"That the State Engineer recommends in his 
11 
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proposed determination herein filed that the de-
cree of this Court now recognize and approve the 
diligence claims of the United States of America 
as heretofore listed and set forth in the appendix 
at pages 361 and 362 of the said proposed deter. 
mination, and that the decree of this Court award 
to the United States of An1erica the rights to the 
use of the waters described in said claim. 
''NOW, THEREFORE, petitioners and each 
of them respectfully pray for judgment a~ fol. 
lows: 
"1. That an order now be issued awarding 
no part of the water rights as listed herein to the 
United States of America, and which order shall 
adjudge and decree that the United States of 
America has never made and is unable to make a 
beneficial use of waters for livestock watering 
purposes as is contemplated and required by the 
laws of the State of Utah; that such beneficial use 
is necessary to complete an appropriation of 
waters in this State, and rejecting each applica-
tion and diligence claim filed by the United States 
of America as listed herein. 
"2. Ordering and directing the State En-
gineer to immediately reject each of the applica-
tions filed by the United States of Ameriea as 
herein listed, together with any other application 
for similar appropriations which might have been 
filed for ·or in behalf of the United Htatt>~; and 
ordering and directing the State Engineer to issue 
such notices as may be required to show the denial 
of each of the diligence clain1s filed for the m;e of 
waters in the drainage area herein concerned. 
"3. For such other and further relief a~ to 
the Court may seem just and equitable." ~ 
12 
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rrhe o-bjections filed by appellants to all of the claims 
a~~erted on behalf of the Federal Government, came on 
for hearing on August 20, 1932, (R. 28-44). At said hear-
ing, appellant~ orally Inoved to strike each and every 
one of the claiins of the United States of An1erica listed 
in said Proposed Detennination (R. 28-30). Appellants 
moved to strike each of the "diligence rights" claims 
listed on pages 361 to 362 upon each of the following 
grounds: 
1. The so-called diligence rights and each of them 
are invalid on the face of the record, inasmuch as they 
purport to antedate the existence of the Forest Service 
of the United States-many years prior to the creation 
of the Forest Service - and no diligence right could 
possibly have been acquired by any agency prior to its 
existence. 
2. The Forest Service at no time owned any live-
stock in the area. 
3. Neither the United States of America not the 
Forest Service operated any livestock in the area so as 
to be able to acquire any diligence water rights . 
.f. There has never been any authority of law for 
the United States Forest Service or the Bureau of Land 
Management to operate in the livestock business, and 
therefore, no authority to appropriate water under the 
law. 
5. The claims are based not on any use made by the 
13 
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United States of America, but on use made hy individual 
water users, who did not act in any governmental capa-
city nor on behalf of the United States of America. 
6. The claims are contrary to Federal law, which 
precluded the Government fr01n claiming water rights, 
particularly in the capacity in which the claims were 
filed. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
based upon statutes enacted as early as 1866, recognized 
the fact that the United States had no water rights nor 
could claim water rights on the public doma.in. 
Appellants also moved to strike each of the claims 
of the United States of America listed on pages 327 and 
328 of the Proposed Deternrination, upon the same 
grounds (R. 30), and in addition thereto protestants 
alleged: 
Application No. 16887, clai1n No. 778, 
Application No. 16878, claim No. 769, 
Application No. 16807, claim No. 793, 
Application No. 16886, claim No. 777, 
Application No. 16810, claim No. 796, 
Application No. 19872, claim No. 1016, 
Application No. 16790, claim No. 789, 
'li'• 
Application No. 17240:, claim No. 780, 
Application No. 17272, claim No. 782, 
Application No. 16808, claim No. 794, 
Application No. 16789, claim No. 788, 
Application No. 16882, clai1n No. 773, 
. '~ 
·j 
:·:~ 
have all lapsed and therefore there is nothing to ad-
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judieate; and applicants are to be allowed five years in 
\rhieh to perfect appropriations, but beneficial use is 
impossible as to any of those applications. Application 
Ko. 17~41, clain1 No. 781, and application No. 16786, claim 
Xo. 785, were withdra·wn according to the information re-
eein•d at the State Engineer·s office, and such appli-
eation~ could not be allowed in this proceeding. In addi-
tion thereto, the balance of the applications and each and 
all of the applications are predicated upon a claim of a 
right to appropriate water, not on the. basis of any use 
made by the United States of America, but on the basis 
of use by permittees of the United ~tates of America, 
which is contrary to la\v. The United States of America 
has invoked a regulation to the effect that no person 
is entitled to a pennit and he is not regarded as a bona 
fide livestock operator unless he· actually owns and op-
erates livestock, and therefore, by its own regulation the 
United States of America is precluded from asserting 
a water right under any of these applications; and it is 
also precluded from asserting any diligence rights. 
(R. 30-32, Exhibit "A"). 
It was admitted at the h_earing that the United States 
of Arne-Pica is not a livestock operator in the area. It 
owns no cattle ranches and no livestock (R. 33). 
Following said hearing of August 20, 1952, a written 
Stipulation was entered into between the United States 
of America, the State Engineer, and the appellants here-
in, filed September 10, 1952, which Stipulation of facts 
is as follows (R. 12-15) : 
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''STIPrLATION 
"The water rights asserted hy the United 
States of America in this case, are limited to 
rights which can be acquired under the laws of the 
state of Utah. Any sovereign rights which the 
United States of America might claim in or with 
respect to the waters of Bear River as an inter-
state stream, are not listed in the Proposed Deter-
mination of the State Engineer, and are not be-
fore the court. The alleged water rights of the 
United States consist of (1) so-called "diligence 
rights," based upon an alleged beneficial use ini-
tiated prior to 1903 and evidenced by water user~· 
claims filed with the State Engineer allegedly pur-
suant to the provisions of Section 3, Chapter !li, 
Laws of Utah 1949, and (2) application for appro-
priation of water filed by the United States al-
legedly pursuant to the provisions of Chapter :1, 
Title 100, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended. 
"IT IS STIPULATED: 
"1. On or about April 2, 1951, the United 
States of America filed ·with the State Engineer 
water users' claims numbered 1104 to 1115, both 
inclusive, which claims are listed as diligence 
claims in the Proposed Determination on pagP~ 
361 and 362. The diligence claims are based upon 
the use of water for stock watering purposes h~· 
livestock operators and others who in the pa~t 
have grazed livestock on the public domain. ~n('h 
use commenced in 1875 and has continued down 
to the present time. 
"2. The United States of America has 
neither owned nor operated any of the livestock 
which has watered at the sources of supply or at 
any of the watt>ring places listed in either the 
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claims of diligence right~ or in the applieation~ 
for appropriation. ~\ny beneficial u:se of the 
water::; with which the lTnited ~tates or an~· gov-
ernmental agene~· i~ here concerned is a use nmde 
by Jiye::;toek exelnsiYely owned and operated by 
intere::-;ts other than the rnited ~tates of Anreriea. 
"~j. :X o grazing pennits were issued on the 
Cache Xational Forest by the United States Forest 
~en·ice prior to 1906, and no permits for grazing 
of liYestock on public lands of the United States 
outside of the national forest were issued prior 
to 1935. 
"±. In filing the aforesaid diligence rights 
clainrs on April :2, 1951, the officials of the United 
~tates at \vhose instance said claims were filed, 
did so in the belief that the past use of the water 
at the points listed in the claims, by livestock oper-
ators, has inured to the benefit of the United 
~tates of Arnerica. In filing the applications to 
appropriate \Vater, the government officials at 
whose instance such applications were filed, did 
so with the purpose of acquiring for the United 
States of America, water rights through the use 
of \\·ater by livestock operators grazing livestock 
under permits issued by the United States for 
the use of forage grown on public lands. 
"5. The sources of water supply described in 
the so-called "diligence rights" claims described 
above, and in the applications for appropriation 
filed by the Pnited States of America as listed 
below, arise generally upon public lands of the 
Fnited States, with the possible exception of Little 
Crawford Spring, shown in the State Engineer's 
Proposed Determination as Claim No. 275. Waters 
frmn some of said sources run off the public lands, 
onto privately owned lands of objectors and 
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others. All streams referred to in the diligence 
claims listed above, and in the applications for 
appropriation listed below, run through public 
lands and also through privately owned lands in 
Rich County, Utah. The objectors and other live-
stock operators in the area concerned, own ranches 
and also range lands, through which these streams 
run. Sorne of these privately owned lands border 
upon and some lie across each of the streams men-
tioned in the claims filed by the United States of 
America. Objectors and other livestock operators 
also own lands in the vicinity of each of the 
streams and springs hereinabove mentioned, so 
that the waters involved in controversy can be 
properly utilized by livestock which graze on 
these privately owned lands. 
"6. The following applications for appropri-
ation of water were filed by the Unit~d States· 
with the State Engineer of the State of rtah, were 
approved by him and according to the records of 
his office are in good standing. 
17239 16788 16809 
17240 16787 16883 
17272 19622 16805 
20337 16791 16880 I 16881 20077 16785 
16877 16806 19954 
A-2388 16884 16885 
16879 21297 
"7. The following applications for appropri-
ation of water were filed by the l ~nited States 
with the State Engineer, were approved hy him, 
but subsequently such applications lapsed or were 
withdrawn: 
18 
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172-!1* 
16887 
l()SIS 
1(iSS(i 
16807 
16810 
19872 
16790 
16786* 
16789 
16808 
16882 
"S. The objectors herein claim rights as 
listed in the State Engineer's Proposed Deter-
lnination, on the sa1ne streams or water courses, 
but down-stream fron1 points of diversion speci-
fied in the clain1s or applications of the United 
States of A1nerica. Objectors also claim rights in 
opposition to the clai1ns of the United States as 
listed in the State Engineer's Proposed Deter-
nlination, designated as follows: 
Objectors' 
Claim Page 
682 156 
508 156 
275 129 
499 173 
495 152 
500 155 
Source 
Upper Otter Creek 
Spring 
Upper Otter Creek 
Little Crawford Spg. 
Hawk Spring 
Old Canyon ~pring 
Otter Creek Spring 
United States' 
Claim 
779 
779 
780 
784 
795 
774 
Page 
328 
328 
327 
328 
328 
326 , 
The foregoing Stipulation was approved by the court 
on September 13, 1952, at the further hearing on the ob-
jections of appellants (R. 44). At said hearing the 
United States of A1nerica agreed to withdraw claim to 
Little Crawford Spring situated on privately owned land 
(R. 47). The Bountiful Livestock Company was added 
to the list of objectors (R. 50). 
At said hearing counsel for the United States of 
America stated for the record that "the whole purpose 
of the Vnited States and the agencies actively making 
claims to the water in this case" is "entirely for the bene-
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fit of permitees and other grantees to graze on the pub-
lic lands" (R. 51). The following state1nent taken from 
each application filed by the United States was read into 
the record as part of the staten1ent of the purpose of the 
Government in making the filings (R. 52): 
"The purpose of the appropriation is to pro-
vide water for livestock using the surrounding 
federal range and to conserve and regulate the 
public grazing lands to stabilize the liYestock in-
dustry dependent on the1n and in aid thereof to 
promote proper use of the privately controlled 
lands and water dependent upon the public graz-
ing lands. The quantity of water sought to be ap-
vropriated is limited to that which can be bene-
ficially used by the persons herein described." 
Counsel for the objectors then offered in evidence, 
and the court received in evidence, Exhibit "A", the Fed-
eral Range Code for Grazing Districts. Exhibit "B", was 
admitted in evidence, which is a map pertaining to Forest 
Reserve lands involved in this case, \vhich shows that 
privately owned and state owned lands are ehecker-
boarded in many instances with federally owned land 
(R. 53-54). 
With respect to the "diligence rights" claims, it wa~ 
stipulated in open court that the United Ntate~ with-
drew its claims of priority as to any uses elaimed to he 
in conflict with the claim of appellants, so that the claims 
asserted by the Federal governinent would be junior to 
the claims of objectors (R. 55-57, 63-65). After the ('a~e 
was argued by written memoranda, the Honorable Lt>wi~ 
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J one~, di~trict judge, iBsued hi8 l\le1noranduu1 of deci-
sion on January 1~, 1953, as follows (R. 16-17): 
.. Objectors haYe InoYed to strike from the 
propo:::ed final decree certain portions thereof 
wherein water righb are proposed hy the State 
Engineer of Ftah to be decreed to the United 
State:::;. By oral argu1nent and written brief, these 
parties challenge the legal right of the United 
State~ to own or control water rights in this State 
in connection with the adn1inistration of public 
lands under the Land ~.Ianagement statutes. Each 
of these springs or water courses arise on the pub-
lic lands within Rich County. 
''Questions presented include: whether 
springs which ari'se on the public domain and 
never reach private property passed to the control 
of Utah under the Enabling and subsequent Acts; 
whether the United States can claim 'diligence' 
rights by reason of the manner of use of said 
springs prior to the creation of the Forest Serv-
ice; whether there has ever been satutory author-
ization for the United States to take the title to 
or hold water rights either in its own right or as a 
trustee for its permitees under the several E'orest 
Service and Land Management statutes; whether 
(assuming that the appropriation must be made 
under Utah law) the government has had tho1se 
tools or animals under its control so that the use 
n1ade of the waters appropriated, or sought to be 
appropriated, is the use of the United States and 
not the use of someone else ; and whether (same 
assumption as supra) the State Engineer's ap-
proval of certain applications to appropriate 
water rights (and the issuance of the usual certi-
ficate of appropriation under our statute) can be 
subjected to collateral attack in this proceeding. 
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"At the hearing a written stipulation of facts 
was submitted by the parties. During the oral 
argun1ent, the United States withdrew its claim 
No. 780 on Little Crawford Springs and further 
stipulated that the final decree might recite that 
in each case of appropriation of water by the 
United States fron1 the same stream or other 
source of supply, the· priority of objectors' rights 
may be shown in the final decree as senior to the 
priority of the Government's rights. This waiver 
on the part of the United States does not satisfy 
the objectors. They maintain that they will still 
be injured because they will be barred in the fu-
ture from acquiring new rights should the Govern-
ment be allocated any water rights whatsoever. 
Objectors further maintain that the Government 
should not be permitted to pre-empt the water 
and thereby control the livestock industry in the 
bureaucratic manner in which it has been function-
ing in the past. 
"But, in view of the waiver of priority on the 
part of the government, I do not feel that a justi-
ciable controversy is presented for determina-
tion. See Huntsville Irrigation Co. v. District 
Court, 72 Utah 431. 
"The attorneys for the Government may pre-
pare findings, conclusions, and a proposed inter-
locutory decree covering the issues raised in this 
particular proceedings, serve copies on counsel 
and mail the original to n1e at Brigham. In thi:-; 
way it will be possible for the objectors to take an 
intermediate appeal, should they be so advised, 
prior to the signing of the final decree." 
The findings of fact recite that "the United States 
of America on various dates subsequent to the year 1944 
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made applications under State law for appropriation 
of water for stock watering purposes" at points on 
public lands: that the g-overnntent also filed diligence 
claim~ nlunbered 110-l to 1115 inclusive, which claims 
are listed on pages 361 to 36:2 of the Proposed Detenni-
nation; that as shown by the Stipulation, objectors 
claim rights as listed in the Proposed Determination, on 
the same streams or water courses, but down-stream 
-._ from points of diversion specified ·in the claim1s or appli-
cations filed by the United States of America, and 
objectors also claim rights in opposition to the clain1s 
of the United States listed in the Proposed Determination 
which are enurnerated; that it was ·stipulated that "in 
each case of appropriation of water by the United States 
from a source of supply from which the objectors have 
made an appropriation, the priority of objectors' rights 
is senior to the priority of the right of the United 
States;" and that "the claim of the United States to the 
water of Little Crawford Spring, evidenced by Claim 
No. 780, page 327 of the Proposed Determination, could 
be considered withdrawn because the claim was made 
upon the assumption that the Little Crawford Spring 
was located_ on public land, where, as a matter of fact, 
such spring is located on private land." (R. 18-19). 
By conclusion of law it is specified that the United 
States of America "is entitled to an Interlocutory Decree 
overruling and denying the objections to the Prop01sed 
Determination interposed by Randolph Land and Live-
stock Company, Desert Livestock Company, Harold 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Selman, Nick Chournos, Orval Johnson and "\Villiam 
Johnson and declaring that there is no justiciable i~8ne 
or contest between the objectors, or any of them, and 
the United States of A1nerica." (R. 19). By the inter-
locutory decree it is provided (R. 20): 
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJrDGED AXD DE-
CREED: 
"1. That there is no justiciable controversy 
between the objectors, Randolph Land and Live-
stock Company, Desert Livestock Company, Har-
old Selman, Nick Chournos, Orval Johnson and 
William Johnson, or any of them, on the one hand, 
and the United States of America, on the other 
hand, over the claims of the United States of 
America li'Sted in the Proposed Determination 
herein. 
"2. That the objections to the claims of the 
United States to the water of Bear River, listed 
in the State Engineer's Proposed Determination 
on pages 327, 328, 361 and 362, which said objec-
tions were heretofore interposed by the objectors 
above named, be and they are hereby overruled 
and denied and the Petition setting forth the 
objections of said objectors is hereby dismissed.'' 
For purposes of this appeal, it is assumed that 
counsel for the United States of America intended to 
include the Bountiful Livestock Company as one of the 
objectors, inasmuch as it was joined at the hearing on 
August 20, 1952; and that the denial of the objections 
applies with equal force to said corporation as well as 
to the objectors actually named. 
On March 17, 1953, this Honorable Court granted the 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
petition for appeal fr01n the interlocutory dt>erPP entered 
Fehruary 7, 1953. 
POI:\'T~ OX \YHIC'H ~\PPl~LLANTS RELY FOR 
REYEHS~\L OF THE IXTERLOCUTORY DECREE 
Point Ko. 1 
A PROCEEDING FOR THE COMPLETE ADJUDICATION 
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER OF A RIVER SYSTEM 
cr;DER SECTIONS 100-4-12 AND 15·, U. C. A. 1943, IS .A 
PROCEEDING FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE 
PRESENT RIGHTS TO THE USE OF THE WATERS OF THE 
RIVER SYSTEM, NOT WHAT THOSE RIGHTS MIGHT 
HAVE BEEN SOME YEARS AGO. 
Point No. 2 
IN A GENERAL WATER ADJUDICATION CASE, THE 
OBJECTION BY A KNOWN WATER USER TO THE STATE 
ENGINEER'S PROPOSED ALLOWANCE OF CERTAIN 
WATER CLAIMS BY A LANDOWNER WHO HAS NEVER 
USED THE WATER AND WHO DOES NOT PRESENTLY 
MAKE ANY BENEFICIAL USE OF THE WATER, DOES 
NOT CONSTITUTE A COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON SOME 
PRIOR PROCEEDING BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER, 
BUT A DIRECT ATTACK UPON THE CLAIM THAT SUCH 
CLAIMANT PRESENTLY HAS A RIGHT TO THE USE OF 
THE WATER. 
Point No. 3 
NEITHER THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NOR 
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ANY OTHER LANDOWNER ON WHOSE LAND WATER 
ARISES, CAN ACQUIRE DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE USE 
OF WATER FOR LIVESTOCK UPON SUCH LAND, WHEN 
THE ONLY BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER WAS MADE BY 
LIVESTOCK OWNERS AND OPERATORS OTHER THAN 
THE LAND OWNER AND WHICH LIVESTOCK OPERATORS 
NEITHER OPERATED UNDER PERMISSION OF OR 
AGREEMENT WITH THE LANDOWNER OR IN SUBORDI-
NATION TO THE LANDOWNER. 
Point No. 4 
WHERE THE LIVESTOCK OPERATORS WHO ACTU-
ALLY MADE THE BENEFICIAL USE OF THE WATER (OR 
THEIR SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST), HAVE ACQUIRED 
DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF THE WATER, THE 
LANDOWNER WHO NEVER USED THE WATER AND HAD 
NO INTEREST IN SUCH LIVESTOCK CANNOT CLAIM 
DILIGENCE RIGHTS PREDICATED UPON SUCH USE 
MADE EXCLUSIVELY BY OTHERS WHEN THERE WAS NO 
PRIVITY WHATSOEVER. 
Point No. 5 
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS IN THIS CASE SHOWS 
CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERI-
CA NEVER ACQUIRED ANY DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE 
USE OF WATER, AND THAT THE DILIGENCE RIGHTS 
CLAIMS WHICH THE STATE ENGINEER PROPOSES TO 
HAVE INCORPORATED INTO THE DECREE ON BEHALF 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ARE VOID. 
Point No. 6 
PRIOR TO THE 1941 AMENDMENT, EXCEPT FOR PUR-
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POSES OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE UNITED 
STATES HAD NO AUTHORITY UNDER THE STATE 
STATUTES TO FILE ON WATER, AND THERE IS NO 
FEDERAL STATUTE WHICH AUTHORIZES THE FOREST 
SERVICE OR THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT TO 
MAKE WATER APPLICATIONS, AND CONSEQUENTLY 
SUCH APPLICATIONS WERE AND ARE VOID. 
Point No. 7 
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS SHOWS THAT EVEN 
IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED 
. STATES OF AMERICA TO FILE APPLICATIONS TO 
APPROPRIATE WATER IN THIS STATE, SUCH APPLICA-
TIONS IN QUESTION WERE VOID AB INITIO IN VIEW OF 
THE FACT THAT THE STIPULATION OF FACTS SHOWS 
THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION ON THE PART OF 
THE APPLICANT TO PUT THE WATER TO BENEFICIAL 
USE. 
Point No. 8 
THE DECLARED PURPOSE IN EACH OF THE APPLI-
CATIONS FILED BY THE UNiTED STATES OF AMERICA 
IS SHOWN TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO PREEMPT THE 
WATER, TO GAIN A MONOPOLY AND TO CONTROL 
OTHER LANDS OF PRIVATE CITIZENS AND TO "REGU-
LATE" THE PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS, AND SUCH PUR-
POSES ARE FOR THE DOMINATION OF THE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS OF OTHERS AND NOT FOR THE APPLICATION 
OF WATER TO BENEFICIAL USE BY THE LANDOWNER 
OR APPLICANT. 
Point No. 9 
THE STIPULATION SHOWS THAT SOME OF THE 
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APPLICATIONS LAPSED OR WERE WITHDRAWN, AND 
THAT WHERE CERTIFICATES OF APPROPRIATION 
WERE ISSUED SUCH PROOF WAS FALSE AND THAT NO 
WATER HAS EVER BEEN PUT TO BENEFICIAL USE, SO 
THAT THERE ARE NO EXISTING RIGHTS TO THE USE 
OF WATER AND NO BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER BEING 
MADE UPON WHICH ANY ADJUDICATION CAN BE MADE 
IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 1 
A PROCEEDING FOR THE COMPLETE ADJUDICATION 
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER OF A RIVER SYSTEM 
UNDER SECTIONS 100-4-12 AND 15', U. C. A. 1943, IS A 
PROCEEDING FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE 
PRESENT RIGHTS TO THE USE OF THE WATERS OF THE 
RIVER SYSTEM, NOT WHAT THOSE RIGHTS MIGHT 
HAVE BEEN SOME YEARS AGO. 
At the further hearing on the objections filed by 
appellants, held on Septen1ber 13, 1952, counsel for the 
United States ~sought to obviate the objections of appel-
lants, by acknowledging the claims of appellants to be 
prior and senior to the claims asserted by the Federal 
government (R. 55-57, 16-20, 63-65). The appellants as 
objectors refused to treat such waiver on the part of 
the government, as a termination of the justiciable con-
troversy. The learned trial judge, however, adopted the 
contention of respondents that such a "waiver" on the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l\.lJ.lpart of the Federal governn1ent ''ter1ninated the con-
~P~flicts. ·· and that there was no longer any "justiciable 
:i'-;eontroYersy." (R.16-17, 57-61). 
,.._ 
!1}1'1;:· 
'<1'1:1~ \Ye contend that the trial court was in error in 
-.. ~:.:_ 
:.U~! dismissing· the objections to the allowance of both the 
~ "diligence rights" clai1ns and the clain1s based upon 
~~ 
alleged applications for appropriation asserted by the 
United States, and in decreeing that there is no justici-
able controYersy, for the reason ·that the statutes of this 
State contemplates that the court in a general adjudi-
eation proceeding shall determine not only the priority 
of rights, but also what are the present rights to the 
use of the water, in quantity, manner and nature of use, 
and also time of use. 
.~: An examination of the statutes inexorably leads to 
·,r the conclusion that the purpose of a general adjudication 
1! i~ ~ r action is to ascertain and define : (a) Who are the per-
sons who presently claim the rights to use the waters~ 
(b) Which claims are presently valid in whole or in 
_: part~ (c) As to the claims which are presently valid, 
how much wa.ter is each claimant presently entitled to 
use, and at what time and in what manner? (d) What 
are the priorities with respect to the present rights to 
use the water~ 
Section 100-4-1, U. C. A. 1943 (73-4-1, U. C. A. 1953) 
specifies: 
"Upon a verified petition to the State Engi-
neer, signed by five or more or a majority of 
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water users upon any stream or water source, 
requesting the investigation of the relative rights 
of the various claimants to the waters of such 
stream or water source, it shall be the duty of 
the state engineer, if upon such investigation he 
finds the facts and conditions are such as to 
justify a determination of said rights, to file in 
the di,strict court an action to determine the vari-
ous rights. In any suit involving water rights 
the court may order an investigation and smTe~· 
by the state engineer of all of the '"a ter rights 
on the source or system involved." 
The statute is clear in defining the scope of such a 
proceeding ws one to investigate "the relative rights of 
the various claimants to the waters," and to "determine 
the various rights." Now here in the statute is there any 
authority to allow the establishment of fictitious claims 
as valid water rights. While the statute does not employ 
the phrwse "at the present time," we believe such is 
implicit in the statute, and also evidenced by the lan-
guage of the context of the several statutes relating to 
general adjudications. By Section 100-4-3, U. C. A. 1943 
(73--4-3, U. C. A. 1953), the State Engineer is required 
to "prepare and file with the court a statement giving 
the names and addresses of all the claimants to the use 
of water from the river 'System or water source involved 
in such actions," and "to this end the clerk of the 
court shall publish" notice of the pendency of such action 
and requiring the claimants to notify the State gng-ineer 
of their names and addresses for the purposes indicated. 
In Smith v. District Court, 69 Utah 493, 256 P. 539, 
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thi~ Court held that the statute was intended to prevent 
piecemeal litigation in the detennination of water rights, 
and to provide 1neans of detennining all rights in one 
action, as the only effectual n1ethod of preventing a 
multiplicity of suits. "~ e believe that the decisions of 
this Honorable Court at least in1ply that the purpose 
of ~ueh a suit is to detennine what water rights the 
various clain1ants actually enjoy at the time of the 
adjudication, not what the party claims nor even what 
those rights n1ight have been in the remote past. 
Section 100-1-3, U. C. A. 1943 (73-1-3, U. C. A. 1953), 
declares that "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
rnea:sure and the limit of all rights to the use of water 
in this state." Water rights, other than diligence rights 
which were acquired prior to 1903, can be acquired only 
by appropriation. "for some useful and beneficial pur-
pose." Section 100-3-1, U. C. A. 1943, (73-3-1, U. C. A. 
1953). By the terms of Section 100-1-4, U. C. A. 1943, 
(73-1-4, U. C. A. 1953), "When an appropriator or his 
successor in interest shall abandon or cease to use water 
for a period of five years the right shall cease, and 
thereupon such water shall revert to the public, and 
may be again appropriated as provided in this title ... " 
In the light of these statutes, in a general adjudica-
tion of the water rights of a river system, the court could 
not properly decree that a claimant is presently entitled 
to use 10.00 c. f. s. of water for irrigation, where for 
illustration, the undisputed evidence showed: (a) The 
elaimant in 1920 properly filed application to appropri-
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ate 10.00 c. f. s. of water for that purpose, and his appli-
cation was approved, but (b) the water clai1nant never 
actually put more than 3.00 c. f. s. of water to beneficial 
use, and finally (c) in 1935 the claimant ceased alto-
gether to use any water and he never again resumed the 
use of water nor filed any application with the State 
Engineer required by Section 100-1-4 for an extension 
of time in which to resume the use of the water. 
Section 100-:-4-5; U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-5, U. C. A. 1953), 
requires each water claimant who is ·served with notice 
in a general adjudication proceeding, to file his claim, 
showing not only where the water was first diverted 
and put to beneficial use, and the flow, but also "the 
place and manner of present use," and "such other facts 
as will clearly define the extent and nature of the 
appropriation claimed." 
Section 100-4-11, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-11, U. C. ~\. 
1953), defines the duty of the State Engineer in making 
his report to the court : 
"Within thirty days after the expiration of 
the sixty days allowed for filing statemenb of 
claims, the state engineer shall begin to tabulate 
the facts contained in the statements filed and to 
investigate, whenever he shall deem neces~ary, the 
facts set forth in said statements by reference to 
the surveys already made or by further ~un'l'y~, 
and shall as expeditiously as possible make a 
report to the court with his recommendations of 
how all rights involved shall be determined. 
"After full consideration of the statement of 
clain1s, and of the :·mr\'e~'s, records, and files, and 
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after a personal exmnination of the river H)'8tem 
or water source involved, if 8twh examination is 
deemed neee:s:snry, the :state engineer shall formu-
late a report and a 1noposed d elcrm ina tion of all 
rights to the w·•e of the zcater of such river system 
or water source, and a eopy of the same shall 
be 1nailed by reg-ular Inail to each clain1ant, with 
notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith 
may within ninety days frmn such date of Inailing 
file with the clerk of the district court a wirtten 
objection thereto duly verified on oath. The state 
engineer shall distribute the ·water from the 
natural streams or other natural sources in 
accordance ·with the proposed determination or 
n1odification thereof by court order until a "final 
decree is rendered by the court;· provided, if the 
right to the use of said waters has been thereto-
fore decreed or adjudicated said waters shall be 
distributed in accordance with such decree until 
the same is reversed, modified, vacated or other-
wise legally set aside.' (Italics added.) 
Section 100-4-12, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-12, U. C. A. 
1953), provides for judgment in the absence of any 
contest: 
"If no contest on the part of any claimant 
shall have been filed, the court shall render a 
judgment in accordance with such proposed 
determination, which shall determine and estab-
lish the rights of the several claimants to the use 
of the water of said river system or water source; 
and among other things it shall set forth the name 
and post-office address of the person entitled to 
the use of the water; the quantity of water in 
acre feet or the flow of water in second feet; the 
time during which the water is to be used each 
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year; the name of the stremn or other source 
from which the water is diverted; the point on 
the stremn or other source where the water i~ 
diverted; the priority date of the right; and such 
other matters as will fully and completely define 
the rights of said claimants to the use of the 
water." (Italics added.) 
The following provisions of the statute, 100-4-13 to 
15 are applicable in the event of a contest: 
"If any contest or objection on the part of 
any claimant shall have been filed, as in this 
chapter provided, the court shall give not less 
than fifteen days' notice to all claimants, stating 
when and where the matter will be heard." Sec-
tion 100-4-13, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-13, U. C. ~-\. 
1953). 
"The staternents filed by the claimants shall 
stand in the place of pleadings, and issues may be 
made thereon. Whenever requested so to do the 
state engineer shall furnish the court with any 
information which he may possess, or copies of 
any of the records of his office which relate to 
the water of said river system or water source. 
The court may appoint referees, masters, engi-
neers, soil specialists, or other persons as neces-
sity or emergency may require to assist in taking 
testimony or investigating facts, and in all pro-
ceedings for the determination of the rights of 
claimants to the water of a river system or water 
source the filed statements of claimants shall he· 
competent evidence of the facts stated therein 
unless the same are put in issue." Section 100-4-
14, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-14, U. C. A. 195:3). 
"Upon the completion of the hearing, after 
objections filed, the court shall enter judgment 
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which shall deter1nine and establish the rights 
of the several claiinants to the use of the water 
of the river system or water source as provided 
in section 100-4-12." 
'rhe statutes above quoted and cited clearly n1ake 
justiciable controversies of" disputes arising from the 
challenge of the validity of water claiins listed in a pro-
posed determination sub1nitted by the State Engineer, 
inasmuch as. the court is required to determine the 
"rights of the several clailnants to the use of the water 
of the river system.'' The party whose claims are 
assailed by objections which. deny that he is presently 
the owner of any water rights whatsoever, cannot suc-
cessfully avoid an adjudication of the issue a:s to the 
validity of his claim by merely saying: "I hereby waive 
all claims of priority with respect to the ciaims of the 
objectors, and I consent to entry of a decree whereby my 
rights will be junior in priority to all claims of the 
objectors. Therefore, there is nothing further to adjudi-
cate, and there is no longer any justiciable controversy, 
the statutes to the contrary notwithstanding." 
By reason of the fact that the duty of the court 
qoes not end with a mere determination that the claims 
of the objectors have priority over the claims filed by 
the Federal government, the trial court was in error 
in dismissing the objections filed by appellants, and in 
failing to make a finding that all of the claims. filed by 
the govern1nent are void. By dismissal of the objections, 
the court inferentially denied the motion of appellants 
to strike from the Proposed Determination all of the 
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claims made by the United States of America, listed on 
pages 327 and 328, and 361 to 362, and the court 
indirectly approved all of those claims as recommended 
by the State Engineer. 
The interlocutory decree \Vas erroneous, in view of. 
the undisputed facts, and it was also erroneous as a 
matter of law. Said decree should be vacated and a ne\r ~ 
decree should be entered denying all of the water claims 
asserted by and on behalf of the United States of 
America and adjudging all of said claims to be null 
and void. 
Point No. 2 
IN A GENERAL WATER ADJUDICATION CASE, THE 
OBJECTION BY A KNOWN WATER USER TO THE STATE 
ENGINEER'S PROPOSED ALLOWANCE OF CERTAIN 
WATER CLAIMS BY A LANDOWNER WHO HAS NEVER 
USED THE WATER AND WHO DOES NOT PRESENTLY 
MAKE ANY BENEFICIAL USE OF THE WATER, DOES 
NOT CONSTITUTE A COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON SOME 
PRIOR PROCEEDING BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER, 
BUT A DIRECT ATTACK UPON THE CLAIM THAT SUCH 
CLAIMANT PRESENTLY HAS A RIGHT TO THE USE OF 
THE WATER. 
At the hearing held on September 13, 1952, the 
respondents made the contention during argument on 
the objections of appellants that those objections con-
stitute a collateral attack upon the proceedings before 
the State Engineer. It was conceded that with respect 
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to the so-called "diligenee rights'' claims filed by the 
rnited States Forest ServicP on April :2, 1951, the 
" ·appellants were given no opportunity to prote~t nor to 
haYe anv hearin()' before the State Engineer (R. 65-66). 
• 0 
\Yith respect to the applications filed by the United 
States beginning in 19-!4, all of which applications were 
filed after this proceeding was initiated, the appellants 
filed no protest with the State Engineer (R,. 66). 
In the -~\Ie1norandmn filed by the trial court, it is 
apparent that the trial judge viewed the objections filed 
by appellants as a collateral attack on the proceed.ings 
before the State Engineer (R. 16). Neither the finding 
of fact, conclusions of law, nor the decree, 1nention 
"collateral attack" (R. 18-19), although the holding that 
there is no '"justiciable controversy" might well embrace 
such a conclusion.. 
We wish to point out that objections filed to a 
proposed determination of rights to the use of water, 
as submitted to the court by the State Engineer, do not 
constitute a collateral attack upon some prior proceed-
ings before the State Engineer. The objections are made 
to the claims filed in the general adjudication proceed-
ing. Inasmuch as a water claimant in a general adjudi-
cation proceeding must file his water claim in such pro-
ceeding, and such claim must show the place and marnner 
of present use (100-4-5 ), the filing of objections to a 
particular water claim is an assertion in the general 
adjudication proceeding that the claimant whose water 
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claim is assailed by such objections does not presently 
. have such water right as claimed. 
The provisions of Section 100-4-11, U. C. A. 1943, 
(73-4-11, U. C. A. 1953), specifically authorize any water 
claimant who is dissatisfied with the proposed deter-
rnination sub1nitted by the State Engineer, to file a 
"written objection" therto. The statute does not pre-
scribe the particular grounds of objection. However, 
we sub1nit that there are numerous valid grounds for 
objections, which would include any of the following: 
(a) The party whose claims of water rights are assailed 
by objection, never actually made any appropriation 
of water. (b) The party whose claims are assailed has 
conveyed his rights or he has otherwise been divested 
of the right to use any water. (c) The party has not 
put to beneficial use all of the water cla~med. (d) The 
right to the use of the water has been lost in whole or 
in part by more than five years of nonuser. (d) The 
water claimant admits in the adjudication proceeding 
that his clairn, although approved by the State Engineer, 
is erroneous or wholly unfounded. 
An attack made upon the claims of one who asserts 
rights to the use of water in a general adjudication case, 
by objections filed in accordance with Section 100-4-ll, 
is a direct attack which is specifically authorized hy 
statut~. lt was never the intention of the Legislature 
to facilita.te establishment of either extravagant or 
fictitious \vater claims. General adjudications are 
designed to establish actual rights as they have accrued 
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and presently exist, and to reject erroneous and ficti-
tious claims, and to srale down elailns which a rP exag-
gerated. Otherwise, the rule that "'Beneficial use shall 
be the basis, the 1ueasure and the lilnit of all righb to 
the use of water in this state" (Section 100-1-3), would 
be nullified by indirection. 
At the hearing held on Septmnber 13, 1952, argu-
ment was 1nade to the effect that objections by appellants 
could not be entertained because the State Engineer 
had already issued certificates in son1e instances where 
the Federal government had filed applications (R. 59-
61). The statute relating to the issuance of a certificate 
hy the State Engineer does not state that it shall be 
conclusive evidence and invulnerable to attack in a 
general adjudication proceeding. Section 100-3-17, U. C. 
A. 1943, (73-3-17, U. C. A. 1953), declares inter alia.: 
'' ... The certificate so issued and filed shall 
be pri1na facie evidence of the owner's right to 
the use of the water in the quantity, for the pur-
pose, at the place, and during the time specified 
therein, subject to prior rights." 
The certificate is only prima facie evidence, which 
means that such evidence can be refuted. In a general 
adjudication proceeding, what happens to such prima 
facie evidence in the light of an admission that the 
alleged appropriator actually appropriated the water 
and applied it to beneficial use for some years, but that 
for more than five years prior to the general adjudica-
tion proceeding he abandoned the use of the water~ 
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The prima facie evidence is overcmne. Likewise, where 
the water claims are assailed by proper objections to 
the effect that the claimant has never applied any water 
to beneficial use, and the claiinant in writing admits 
that he has actually never appropriated any water to 
beneficial use and that the proof sub1nitted to the State 
Engineer was utterly false, the prinm facie evidence of 
the certificate is totally destroyed, and the admission 
of the claimant that he has never used the water bene-
ficially, requires an adjudication that his claim is invalid. 
The objections filed by appellants to allowance of 
any of the claims asserted on behalf of the United State~, 
were valid objections under the statutes, constituting a 
direct attack upon the .claims of the United States of 
America as to the right to the present use of the water. 
In the light of the Stipulation of facts, the trial court 
should have sustained each of the objections and granted 
each motion to strike the claims asserted h)' the United 
States as set forth in the proposed decree. 
Point No. 3 
NEITHER THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NOR 
ANY OTHER LANDOWNER ON WHOSE LAND WATER 
ARISES, CAN ACQUIRE DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE USE 
OF WATER FOR LIVESTOCK UPON SUCH LAND, WHEN 
THE ONLY BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER WAS MADE BY 
LIVESTOCK OWNERS AND OPERATORS OTHER THAN 
THE LAND OWNER AND WHICH LIVESTOCK OPERATORS 
NEITHER OPERATED UNDER PERMISSION OF OR 
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AGREEMENT WITH THE LANDOWNER OR IN SUBORDI-
NATION TO THE LANDOWNER. 
Our position i8 that the United State8 of America 
is in no better position than any other landowner in 
attempting- to acquire the right to use unappropriated 
waters of this State. A landowner, like anyone else, 
must comply with the law8 of this State pertaining to 
acquisition of water rights. O"·nership of the land does 
not give the landowner a right to the use of any unap-
propriated water arising on his land. Neither does 
ownership of the land vest in him the right to use water 
which has been lawfully appropriated by some other 
person. Ownership of land does not constitute the owner 
an appropriator of water. Jurisdiction over the appro-
priation of fugitive waters within the State is vested 
in the State, not in the Federal government. 
Nine years after this general adjudication proceed-
ing was initiated, the United States Forest Service on 
April 2, 1951, filed the ''diligence rights" claims for 
stockwatering. which are controversy here. Disregarding 
the fact that Congress never authorized the filing of 
water claims by or for and on behalf of the F·orest 
Service or any other Federal agency except the Bureau 
of Reclamation, the United States was in no better 
position legally than any other landowner who never 
owned any livestock and ·who had never operated any 
livestock nor put any water to beneficial use by live-
stock watering. When those claims were challenged by 
objections in this proceeding, it was admitted by written 
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stipulation that the livestock which actually used the 
water was owned and operated by interests other than 
the Federal government. By stipulation it was explained 
that 
"4. In filing the aforesaid diligence rights 
claims on April 2, 1951, the officials of the 
United States at whose instance said claims were 
filed, did so in the belief that the past use of 
water at the points listed in the claims, by live-
stock operators, has inured to the benefit of the 
United States of America." 
For the first time, the novel but patiently absurb 
claim was advanced in 1951 that a landowner on whose 
land the water arose, vicariously acquired water rights 
for stockwatering purposes. Such claim was predicated 
not on any acts of appropriation by the landowner, but 
entirely on the belief of some government officials that 
the application of :water to beneficial use by livestock 
operators on gover~ment-owned lands, enured to the 
benefit of the United States. That amounts to saying 
that any landowner, who has never appropriated any 
water to a beneficial use, can claim the benefit of appro-
priations made by livestock operators with whom there 
is no privit)·, simply because such beneficial use wa~ 
made on his land. 
The clai1ns of the government strike at the funda-
Inental basis of the entire doctrine that water rights 
can only be acquired h~· appropriation for beneficial use. 
If those claims were to be established a:-; law, there would 
arise a novel :')·~tem of dual water rights-one ~Pt of 
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water rights in t11e persons who actually put the watPr 
~: to beneficial use as lawful appropriators, and duplieatP 
~ set of water rights vested in the landownPr acquired 
without any beneficial use by the landowner, but solely 
bv virtue of a beneficial use made unon his ·}and hv 
others. Ownership of public land does not earry with 
ownership of the migrating waters which arise on tho~ 
~r lands. Congress did not reserve to the United Stat€ 
of ~~merica in connection with any public lands, title to 
the fugitive waters arising on those lands or flowing 
through thern. Because of the absolute dependency of 
citizens on the use of water originating on the public do-
main in the west, the rule of appropriation of \Vater for 
beneficial use arose as a matter of necessity. Water aris-
ing on public lands becarne necessary for cities, mining, 
stockwatering and agriculture. Congress did not see fit 
to pre-empt the water arising on public lands~ The doc-
trine of riparian rights recognized at cormnon law, had 
to yield to the march of progress in the West. As early 
as 1866, Congress recognized the doctrine of a ppropria-
tion of water for beneficial use. And it must not be over-
looked, that such doctrine arose with respect to waters 
arising on the public domain, inasmuch as there was 
then very little privately owned land. 
By the act of July 26, 1866, (14 Stat., 253), it was 
recognized that citizens could acquire the use of waters 
arising on public lands by application of water to bene-
ficial use, and Congress expressly authorized the estab-
lishment of rights-of-ways over public lands for the con-
struction of ditches and canals. As embodied in Sec. 
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2339 of the Revised Statutes, 30 U. S. C. A. sec. ;)J the 
' ' 
statute reads : 
. "Whenever, by priority of possession, rights 
to the use of water for 1nining, agricultural, manu-
facturing, or other purposes have vested and ac-
crued, and the same are recognized and acknowl-
edged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions 
of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested 
rights shall be maintained and protected in the 
same; and the right-of-way for the construction 
of ditches and canals for the purposes herein spe-
cified is acknowledged and confirmed; * * *." 
By the act of _L\Iarch 3, 1891, (26 Stat., 1097), R. S. 
2340,30 F. S. C.A. sec. 52, it was provided: 
''All patents granted, or homesteads allowed, 
shaH be subject to any vested and accrued water 
rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used 
in connection with such water rights, as may have 
been acquired under or recognized by section 
51 of this title." 
The act of _March 3, 1877, (19 Stat., 377), known as 
the "Desert Land Act," 4-3 U. N. C. A. 321, provided for 
acquisition of title to 320 acres of desert land, by persons 
who sought to conduct .water upon the said land in ac-
cordance with the rules and laws relating to a.pproprw-
tion; 
"* * * That the right to the use of watPr hy 
the person so conducting the san1e, on or to any 
tract of desert land of three hundred and twenty 
acres shall depend upon bona fide prior aJJJJropri-
ation; and <..,·uch right shall not e.rcced the lliJIOUIIf 
of 1cater actllally aJJ}JrO]Jriated, and JH'<'P:-i:-;aril~· 
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,, 
l 
used for the purpo~e of irrig-ation aiHl rt>elnma-
tion: and all surplus watPr over and above such 
actual a.ppropriativn and use, togl:'tlwr with tlw 
water of all lake8, riyer~, and other soun·c~ of 
water supply upon the public lands and not navi-
gable, shall re1nain and be held free for the ap-
propriation and use of the public for irrigation, 
mining and n1anufacturing purposes ~mbject to 
existing rights. * * *" (Italics added). 
In Tu·in Falls Salmon Rirer Laud, etc., Co. r. Cald-
well, (C. C. ~l., Idaho 1921), :272 F~ 356, affirmed 266 U.S. 
85, 45 S. Ct. :2:2, 69 L. Ed 178, the court pointed out that· 
the State has jurisdiction over the appropriation of water 
for beneficial use: 
"The relation of the federal government to 
the state government in the reclamation of desert 
lands arises out of the fact that the federal gov-
ernment owns the lands, and Congress is invested 
by the Constitution with the power of disposing of 
the same, while the state has been given juris-
diction to provide for the appropriation and bene-
ficial use of the waters of the state which neces-
sarily includes a use for the reclamation of such 
lands." 
Article XVI, Section 1, Constitution of Utah, which 
was approved by Congress, provides : 
"All existing rights to the use of any of the 
waters in this State for any useful or beneficial 
purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed." 
Thus, by approval of the State Constitution which was 
adopted in 1895, Congress approved the doctrine of bene-
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flcial use of water, as part of the funda1nentallaw of this 
State. That rule has never been changed. 
By the terms of the Reclamation act of June 17,1902, 
( 32 Stat. 390), Congress recognized the doctrine of ap-
propriation, and also the paranwunt authority of the 
state~ to control the acquisition of water rights. As set 
forth in 431~. S.C. A. sec. 372: 
"The right to the use of water acquired under 
the provisions of the reclamation law shall be 
appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial 
use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit 
of the right." 
In -!3 F. S. C. A. sec. 383, of the same act, it is 
provided: 
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
as affecting or intending to affect or to in any 
interfere with the laws of any State or TerritorY 
relating to the control, appr~priation, use or di~­
tribution of water used in irrigation, or any 
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Seere-
tary of the Interior, in can·~ring out the provision~ 
of this chapter, shall proceed in conformity with 
such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way 
affect any right of any State or of the Federal 
Government or of any landowner, appropriator, 
or user of water in, to, or from any interstate 
stream or the waters thereof." 
Congress expressly recognized the rule that all rights 
to the use of nonnavigable waters, had to be acquired 
under state law. See Board of Directors, etc. r. Jorgen-
sen, et al., 136 P. 2d 461. In a concurring opinion in that 
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case, at pages 468 to 469, the aforesaid ~tatute is quotPd, 
with the following observation: 
"* • • The Reclaination Aet give~ to the 
United States by and through its Secretary of the 
Interior the same, but no superior, right to ap-
propriate the public unappropriated waters of the 
State of Idaho as the laws of this state give to the 
individual. 43 P. S. C. A., §§ 372 and 383; United 
States v. West Side Irr. Co., D. C., 230 F. 28-t." 
As stated in United Sta.tes z·. Union Gap b-rigation 
()o., 209 F. 27 4: "The govern1nent, like an individual, can 
appropriate only so much water as· it applies to bene-
ficial uses." 
In construing the aforesaid provision of the Re-
clamation Act, in Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82, 81 L. Ed. 525, 
57 S. Ct. 412, the United States Supren1e Court held that 
the specified activities of the Federal government under 
the act in the case then before the court, did not vest in 
the government any title to the _water: 
"* * * Although the government diverted, 
stored and distributed the water, the contention 
of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water 
or water-rights became vested in the United States 
is not well founded. Appropriation was made not 
for the use of the government, but, under theRe-
clamation Act, for the use of the landowners; and . 
by the ter1ns of the law and of the contract alreadv 
referred to, the water-rights becan1e the propert}T 
of the landowners, wholly distinct from the prop-
. erty right of the government in the irrigation 
works. Compare Murphy v. Kerr (D. C.) 296 F. 
536, 544, 545. The government was arid ren1ained 
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si1nply a carrier and distributor of the water 
(ibid), with the right to receive the smns stipu-
lated in the contracts as reimbursement for the ~ 
cost of construction and annual"charges for opera-
tion and maintenance of the works. A~ security 
therefor, it was provided that the government 
should have a lien upon the lands and tlze water-
rights appurtenant thereto-a provision which in 
itself imports that the water-rights belong to an-
other than the lienor, that is to say, to the land 
owner. 
"The Federal government, as owner of the 
public domain, had the power to dispose of the 
land and water composing it together or sepa-
rately; and h~T the Desert Land Act of 1 S/1, (chap. 
107, 19 Stat. at L. 377, 43 F. S. C. A. § 321), if not 
before, Congress had severed the land and "'atPr;-; 
constituting the public domain and established 
the rule that for the future the lands should be 
patented separately. Acquisition of the govern-
ment title to a parcel of land was not to cmT~' with 
it a water-right; but a1l non-navigable waters 
were reserved for the use of the publie under the 
laws of the various arid-land states. California 
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Ce11wnt Co., :2!);) r. 
S. 142, 162, 79 L. ed. 1356, 1363, 55 S. Ct. 725. "" "",.., 
There is no law of this State under which a land-
o_wner can claim the benefit of an appropriation of water 
by others over whoru he has no control and with whom 
there is no privit~'· Appropriation of unappropriated 
waters in this Stab• can be made onl~, hy compliance with 
State law. Even the government apparPntly recognized 
this rule when it purported to file its fin-called "diligence 
rights" e]aim~. 
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An appropriation of water to beneficial use inYolves 
three essential~, not one of which was ever ::-;atisfied 1>~' 
the United ~tate~ Forest ~ervice in regard to the so-
called "diligence clai1n~": (a) There must be an intent 
to apply the water to some beneficial use. (b) There 
must be a diversion of the water fr01n the strea1n or 
source. (c) The water diverted 1nust be applied to bene-
ficial use by the appropriator. Sowards v. 1lf eagher, 37 
t:tah 21:2, 108 P. 111:2. ~-\s pointed out in Hague 17. Nephi 
Irn:gation Co., "appropriation" does not merely 1nean a 
diYersion of water, but involves an intention on the part 
of the appropriator to put the water to a beneficial use 
and also the actual application of the water to a bene-
ficial use; so that if a party diverts more than he can 
benefically use, he does not actually appropriate the 
excess. 
In Robinson u. Shoenfelt, 62 Utah 233, 218 P. 1041, 
the plaintiff claimed a diligence right for stockwatering 
at a spring upon the public domain in Kane County, Utah, 
and he sought to enjoin interference hy defendant. While 
the proof showed that he had watered cattle at the spring, 
he had not watered his cattle to the exclusion of other 
cattle operators on the public domain, and the court held 
that he did not acquire a diligence right by the intermit-
tant use which was indeterminable in quantity. The court 
also made it clear that the use n1ade 1nust he for the ex-
clusive benefit of the appropriator: 
''In Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake Yiew Duck 
Club et al., 50 Utah at page 82, 166 Pac. at page 
311, L. R. A. 1918 B, 620, this court said: 
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"'But for the purpose of effecting a 
valid appropriation of water under the stat-
utes of this state we are decidedly of the 
opinion that the beneficial use contemplated 
in n1aking the appropriation 1nust he one that 
riator and subject to his complete dominion 
and control.' See, also, sections 759 et seq., 2 
l{inney on Irrigation." 
Under this standard, the United States as a land-
owner could not possibly clain1 the benefit of any ap-
propriations of water for stockwatering purposes made 
by the various cattle and sheep operators who actually 
used the water on the government-owned lands. Such 
use could only inure to the benefit of the actual appropri-
ators, who were the livestock operators; for such use 
·was not subject to or under the dmninion and control of 
the government, but on the contrary, such use was inde-
pendent of any supervision or control whatsoever of the 
Federal governn1ent. In fact, the government did not 
know who were the livestock operators, and it does not 
now know who they were, and could not possibly identify 
any of them. 
Neither the Federal government nor any other land-
owner, can lawfully claim diligence rights for stockwater-
ing, when the only beneficial use of water for stock-
watering prior to 1903, was initiated and continued ex-
clusively by livestock operators whose operations were 
independent of the landowner. The government had no 
interest in the livestock which made a consumptive use 
of the water, and the government exercised no control 
so 
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over the livestork operators who appropriated the water 
to beneficial use. The belief of some government offi-
cials that such beneficial use which was 111ade independ-
ent of govern1nent regulation or control, "'enured to the 
benefit of the lTnited States,'' fortunately did not change 
the existing law. The govern1nent claims of diligenre 
rights are based entirely on the fictitious premise that a 
landowner could acquire such a right without actually 
making an appropriation of water to beneficial use. Such 
a daim, if established, 'vould create in the landowner a 
duplicate water right, in direct opposition to the funda-
mental rule that beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure, and the limit of the right to use water. 
Point No. 4 
WHERE THE LIVESTOCK OPERATORS WHO ACTU-
ALLY MADE THE BENEFICIAL USE OF THE WATER (OR 
THEIR SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST), HAVE ACQUIRED 
DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF THE \VATER, THE 
LANDOWNER WHO NEVER USED THE WATER AND HAD 
NO INTEREST IN SUCH LIVESTOCK CANNOT CLAIM 
DILIGENCE. RIGHTS PREDICATED UPON SUCH USE 
MADE EXCLUSIVELY BY OTHERS WHEN THERE WAS NO 
PRIVITY WHATSOEVER. 
The cases which we have previously cited, as well as 
the statutes, indicate that private citizens could lawfully 
appropriate water to beneficial use on the public domain. 
See Sowards v. Meagher, 37 U. 212, 108 P~ 1112. Appel-
lants and other water claimants acquired diligence rights 
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based upon actual application of \Yater to beneficial use, 
dating back to 1875. Those uses were not in subordi-
nation to any claims of the r nited States of America, for 
the government made no such claims prior to 1951. The 
government had no interest in the livestock which actu-
ally watered at the watering places in question on the 
government-owned lands. In fact, the government had 
nothing whatever to do with the appropriations of water 
for stockwatering purposes by the livestock operators. 
No claim is made that the Federal government ever 
succeeded to the rights of the livestock operators who ac-
tually appropriated the water to a beneficial use. rrhe 
government has never been in the livestock busine:-;:-;, at 
least in the area in question, so that it could not have been 
the successor in interest. It has neither acquired live-
stock nor had the management of any of the livestock 
which utilized the water. None of the rights of the lin'-
stock operators have been acquired hy the United Statet' 
through purchase, levy or by eminent domain proceed-
ings. If the government had acquired the ownership of 
those rights, the appropriators or their :-;nr(·essors in 
intere~t would have necessarily been divested of thosP. 
right~. No claim of succession is made. The substance of 
the govern1nent claim is that the appropriation of water 
h:· the livestock operators to a beneficial use in watPring-
their livestock, "enured to the benefit of the l 'nited 
States.'' If the livestock operators them:-;rlvP:-; acquired no 
water rights b:· beneficial use, hy reason of failure on 
their part to comply with the law, such a failure could 
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not have enuretl to the benefit of tlw landowner anyway 
when such landowner did none of the ad~ e~~ential to an 
appropriation of water. HowPver, if the live~tock opera-
tor~ acquired diligence righb, which does not seem to be 
disputed, tho~e rights \Yere ye~ted in them, not in the 
landowner. 
Congre~s has recognized the faet that livestock op-
erators did acquire water rights on the public domain, not 
only by the early legislation previously cited, but by 
more recent legislation. By the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 
U. S. C. A., 315 et seq., it is provided (sec. 315b) : 
"* * * Preference shall be given in the issu-
ance of grazing permib-1 to those within or near 
a district, who are landowners engaged in the 
livestock busines~, bona fide occupants or settlers, 
or owners of water rights, as n1ay be necessar)T to 
permit the proper use of lands, tcater or water 
rights owned, occupied, or leased by them, * * * ." 
(Italics added). 
In the Federal Range Code, Exhibit ''A", 161.1 (b), 
the same rule i~ stated. In fact, by such code, in order to 
obtain a· permit, the party must be a citizen (or have de-
clared his intention to become one j and Inust be engaged 
in the livestock business. Under its own regulation, the 
United States could not qualify to graze any livestock, 
since it has never been engaged in the livestock business. 
By the F'ederal Range Code, the United States has 
recognized the fact that livestock operators have acquired 
rights to the use of water whether that water has its ori-
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gin on the public domain or elsewhere. 
K o claim is made in the case that there wai5 any 
agreement between the stockmen and the government with 
respect to the application of water to beneficial use. 
r:rhere \vas no privity between the government and the 
appropriators of water for stockwatering purposes. The 
heneficial use made was that of the livestock operators, 
not a use hy the government. The use by the livestock 
operators was exclusive, since the United States owned 
no livestock and had no control of livestock. 
Inasmuch as duplicate water rights or dual water 
rights cannot exist in the State of Ftah, the fact that the 
livestock operators acquired diligence rights and Iwwr 
conveyed the same to the government, precluded the Fed-
eral government fr01n acquiring those identical water 
rights. The govermnent does not claim that it acquired 
any rights fr01n the original appropriators b)~ purchase, 
levy, or e1ninent domain. 
J£ven if it were assu1ned that the livestock operators 
who acquired diligence stockwatering rights h)· approp-
riation to beneficial use some of the waters arising on 
government-own lands, subsequently lost those diligenee 
rights hy more than five )-ears of nonuser, such forfeit-
ure on the part of the original appropriators could not 
aid the claims of the government. Where a party loses 
his right b)- nonuser, that water reverts to the public and 
becomes subject to re-appropriation (100-1 --1-, P. C. A. 
1943, 7i~-1--t-, e. c. A. 1953). Thus, in no P\'Pllt could the 
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<YOvernment benefit from anY art or failure on the part b • 
of the appropriators. 
Point No. 5 
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS IN THIS CASE SHOWS 
CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERI-
CA NEVER ACQUIRED ANY DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE 
USE OF WATER, AND THAT THE DILIGENCE RIGHTS 
CLAIMS WHICH THE STATE. ENGINEER PROPOSES TO 
HAVE INCORPORATED INTO THE DECREE ON BEHALF 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ARE VOID. 
The Stipulation of facts clearly above shows that the 
Federal govern1nent neither appropriated any water to 
beneficial use for stockwatering, nor had any control or 
ownership over the livestock which actually used the 
water: 
"IT IS STIPULATED: 
"1. On or about April 2, 1951, the United 
States of America filed with the State Engineer 
water users' claims nun1bered 1104 to 1115, both 
inclusive, which claims are listed as diligence 
claims in the Proposed Determination on pages 
361 and 362. The diligence claims are based upon 
the use of water for stock watering purposes by 
livestock operators and others who in the past 
have grazed livestock on the public domain. Such 
use cmnmenced in 1875 and has continued down 
to the present time. 
"2. The United States of America has 
neither owned nor· operated any of the livestock 
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which has watered at the sources of supply or at 
any of the watering places listed in either the 
claims of diligence rights or in the applications 
for appropriation. Any beneficial use of the 
waters with which the rnited States or any gov-
ernmental agency is here concerned is a use made 
by livestock exclusively owned and operated hY 
interests other than the Fnited States of Amerie~. 
"3. No grazing perinits were issued on the 
Cache National Forest prior to 1906, and no per-
mits for grazing of livestock on public lands of the 
United States outside of the national forest \rere 
issued prior to 1935. 
"4-. In filing the aforesaid diligence right~ 
claims on April 2, 1951, the officials of the Fnited 
States at whose instance said claims were filed, 
did so in the belief that the past use of the water 
at the points listed in the claims, by livestock op-
erators, has inured to the benefit of the 1ynited 
States of America. In filing the applications to 
appropriate water, the government officials at 
whose instance such applications were filed, did 
so with the purpose of acquiring for the United 
States of America, water rights through the use 
of water by livestock operators grazing bYr~to<'k 
under permits issued by the United States for the 
use of forage grown on public lands." 
The Stipulation shows conclusively that prior to 
1903 when any diligence rights claims would have arisrn, 
the l-;-nited States of Ameriea did not even issue a permit 
for the use of the forests, and that as to the balance 
of the public don1ain, no grazing permits were issued 
prior to 1935. The Stipulation J>l'P<'lndc>s an~· possibility 
that diligence rights for stockwatering- purpos<>s were 
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ever acquired by the Federal Government. 'l'he ~tipula­
tion in effect ad1nits the grounds stated in the motion of 
appellants 1nade on August :m, 195:2, to strike the diligence 
rights clai1ns recapitulated here as follows (R. ~8-29) : 
1. The so-called '"diligence rights" and each or the1n 
are invalid on the fact of the record, inasmuch as they 
were filed on behalf of the Forest Service and they pur-
port to antedate the existence of the F'orest Service. 
Even if the Forest Service had been authorized by both 
State and Federal statutes to acquire diligence rights for 
stockwatering (which appellants deny) it could not ac-
ownership of the waters which arise on those lands. 
Congress did not atte1npt to reserve to the United States 
quire a right before it caine into existence. 
2. Neither the Forest Service nor any other agency 
of the United States ever operated any livestock in the 
area so as to be able to acquire any diligence rights. 
3. The claims were not based on any use 1nade by 
the rnited States of America, nor by any agent or 
agency, but based on use by individual water users with 
whom there was no privity, none of said users ever having 
acted for or on behalf of the United States. 
4. There was no authority of law for acquiring any 
diligence rights by the Forest Service, even if there, had 
been a Federal statute pennitting such acquisition, for 
prior to 1941 our State statutes, 100-3-2, U. C. A. 1943, 
did not pennit the appropriation of water by the United 
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States except by and through the Bureau of Reclamation, 
and by that time it had become impossible to acquire 
any diligence rights for approximately 48 years. 
The trial court should have granted the appellant's 
rnotion to strike each of the so-called diligence el.aims, for 
the reason the United States conclusively demonstrated 
by its stipulation that it did not do any of the acts essen-
tial to the appropriation of water to a beneficial use for 
stockwatering, prior to 1903 or at ~y other time. The 
gqvernn1ent owned no livestock and it did not operate any 
livestock by which a beneficial use of the water could have 
been made. No beneficial use was ever made by or under 
the control or supervision of the United States. No 
agency of the government exercised any dominion over 
the stockwatering, and therefore there could not have 
been any appropriation of water for beneficial use. 
An· appropriation of water still consists of putting 
the same to· a beneficial use. See Wellsville East Field 
Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah. 
448, 137 P. 2d 634. As indicated in Adams v. Portage Irri-
gation Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P. 2d 648, the use of water for 
stockwatering purposes is an appropriation of water by 
the livestock operators. The only parties who put the 
water to beneficial use on the govennnent-owned lands, 
were the livestock operators. There was no privity be-
tween the livestock owners and the Federal government. 
There 'vas no foundation for the claiin that diligenet> 
rights were claimed hy virtue of the belief of some gov-
ernment officials that the acts of the livestock operators 
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who actually put the water to henefi<-·ial use, "pnured to 
the benefit of the Pnited States." 
Inasmuch as the government admittt~d faet~ which 
showed that ih~ claims of diligence rights were wholly 
unfounded, and that the Federal gover1unent neYer made 
any appropriation of water for stockwatering purposes, 
the appellants \\·ere entitled to a finding that there wa~ 
no appropriation of water for beneficial use and a conclu-
sion of law to the effect that the diligence clai1ns were null 
and Yoid ab initio. The appellants are entitled to a de-
cree adjudging those diligence clain1s to be null and 
,·oid, the smne as any other unfotmded clain1s, for the 
reason that the proof here was conclusive, by virtue of 
the admission of facts in the stipulation on which reason-
able minds could not differ. 
Point No. 6 
PRIOR TO THE 1941 AMENDMENT, EXCEPT .FOR PUR-
POSES OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE UNITED 
STATES HAD NO AUTHORITY UNDER THE STATE 
STATUTES TO FILE ON WATER, AND THERE IS NO 
FEDERAL STATUTE WHICH AUTHORIZES THE FOREST 
SERVICE OR THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT TO 
MAKE WATER APPLICATIONS, AND CONSEQUENTLY 
SUCH APPLICATIONS WERE AND ARE VOID. 
Prior to 1919, the State statute allowed "Any person, 
corporation, or association, to hereafter acquire the right 
to the use of any public water in the State of Utah.'' 
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C. L. U. 1917, sec. 3451. In 1919, the statute was amended 
to read: 
"Any person who is a citizen of the Fnited 
States, or was has filed his declaration of inten-
tion to become such as required by the naturaliza-
tion law~, or any association of such citizens or de-
clarants, or any corporation, in order hereafter to 
acquire the right to the use of any unappropriated 
public water in this state shall, before commenc-
ing the construction, enlargement or extension of 
any ditch, canal or other distributing works, or 
performing si1nilar work tending to acquire such 
right or appropriation, make an application in 
writing to the State Engineer." f.;ection 100-3-2, 
R. S. U. 1933). 
By chapter 40, Laws of Utah 1941, Section 100-3-2 
was mnended hy inserting after the word "corporation,'' 
the following: 
"or the state of Utah h!' the chairman of the 
commission of publicity and industrial develop-
ment, the fish and game commissioner, the exeeu-
tive secretarY of the state land board or the 
chairman of ·the state road commission for the 
use and benefit of the public, or the lTnitPd Statl·~ 
of America." 
Except for the Bureau of Reclamation, there wa:-; 
no authorit!T granted by law for an)' agency of the United 
States to acquire any water rights prior to the 1941 
amendment. The Forest Service wa~ i1npotent to claim 
any diligence rights, inasmuch as those diligence right~ 
all allegedly ante-dated the setting up of the 1~-,oret-~t 
Service in the Cache National Forest in 1906. An ag-en<'Y 
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·< could not acquire diligence rights before it had any 
existence. 
Even if the Forest Service had been permitted by 
an act of Congress to acquire stockwatering rights, it 
would have been compelled to do exactly what any citizen 
or prospective citizen would have been required to do. 
Prior to July 1, 194i, the United States of Alnerica did 
not come "·ithin the orbit of eligible persons are entities, 
except in the ca~e of the Bureau of Reclmnation which 
was authorized under other statutes. Under no circurn-
stance could the govern1nent have acquired any diligence 
rights for stockwatering, not only for the reason that no 
appropriation was made, but likewise because there was 
no authority granted under our state laws for such 
acquisition until 38 years after the possibility of acquir-
ing diligence rights had ended. Even in the cases where 
diligence rights could have been predicated upon use 
of underground waters fron1 springs and wells prior 
to 1937 where the wateT did not flow in any well-defined 
channel, the Forest Service would have been precluded 
from any legal authority; and claims of such a character 
are not involved here. 
Nor do the Federal statutes authorize what has 
been attempted here. As late as August 28, 1937, in the 
act for Water Conservation, Congress did not authorize 
Federal agencies to acquire water rights except for 
purposes specifically authorized, 16 U. S. C. A., 590 ( 4) : 
" ( 4) To obtain options upon and to acquire 
lands, or rights or interests therein, or rights to 
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the use of water, h:~ purchase, lease, gift, 
exchange, condemnation, or otherwise, only when 
necessary for the purposes of sections 590r-590x 
of thi~ title." 
The overarching objective of the Reclamation Laws 
is to aid private citizens to acquire water rights appur-
tenant to land which they otherwise would be financially 
unable to acquire. None of the Federal legislation mani-
fests any intention to transfer to the Federal government 
or any agency thereof, control over the non-navigable 
waters of this State or of any other State. 
The attempt to assert diligence stockwatering rights, 
was obviously void. \Ve contend that with respect to 
the applications for appropriations, all filed at least two 
years after this proceeding was instituted, there was no 
Federal law to authorize the same, even if authorized 
b:~ the State law in 1941. 
Point No. 7 
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS SHOWS THAT EVEN 
IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA TO FILE APPLICATIONS TO 
APPROPRIATE WATER IN THIS STATE, SUCH APPLICA-
TIONS IN QUESTION WERE VOID AB INITIO IN VIEW OF 
THE FACT THAT THE STIPULATION OF FACTS SHOWS 
THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION ON THE PART OF 
THE APPLICANT TO PUT THE WATER TO BENEFICIAL 
USE. 
Everything which has be€m said previously with 
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respect to the clailus of diligence right~, applies with 
equal force here, with regard to the alleged a ttPmpt:-; 
to initiate water rights for stoekwatering frotn and after 
19-U. The stipulation of facb recites: 
··-t • • • In filing the applications to appro-
priate water, the government officials at whose 
instance such applications were filed, did so with 
the purpose of acquiring for the United States 
of America) water rights through the use of water 
by livestock operators grazing livestock tmder 
permits issued by the United States for the use 
of forage grown on public lands." 
In the case of diligence claims, the government 
claimed the benefit of the acts of the appropriators who 
watered their livestock on governn1ent-owned lands, with-
out having permits. In the case of the applications for. 
appropriation, the government takes the position that 
if a person cmnes upon land under a grazing permit 
from the owner, the application of water to bene~icial 
use by the permittee inures to the benefit of the land-
owner. A mere permit to graze, which does not have 
the effect of exercising control over the application of 
water to beneficial use, cannot make the beneficial use 
of \Vater by the .permittees the beneficial use of the 
landowner . The acts of appropriation are still the acts 
of the livestock operator. As far as the permits are 
concerned, the livestock operators could water their 
stock on the adjoining privately owned lands. The per-
mits do not vest in the United States any control over 
the watering of the livestock. 
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The permittees are not in the same category of 
lessees of land \Yhich is irrigated by the lessees under 
an agree1nent that the lessees shall apply the water upon 
the land on behalf of the owner to prove up on the 
owner's application to appropriate the water for irriga-
tion. 
Furthermore, the stipulation clearly shows a lack 
of intention on the part of the United States to apply 
the water to beneficial use for stockwatering. The water-
ing of livestock is not a function of the government 
under the terms of the permits. The livestock operators 
water their livestock where, when and how they deem 
appropriate. The watering is under the superYision and 
control of the livestock operators. 
As hereinabove pointed out, in some cases the State 
Engineer issued certificates of appropriation. Those 
certificates were only prima facie evidence of appropri-
ation of water by the applicant; and the stipulation 
shows that such prima facie evidence is entirely false, 
and that no appropriation was ever made by the FnitPd 
States of An1erica. The stipulation shows that the 
l!nited States did not intend to perform any of the 
acts essential to an appropriation of water to beneficial 
u:-;e for stockwatering, but to claim the benefit of indefi-
nite and in many cases unknown acts of the pennittees. 
\Ve contend that the Honorable Lewis Jones, distriet 
judge, should have granted the motion to strike earh of 
the claims based upon appropriation, since· then~ obvi-
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ou~ly was no appropriation and no intention whatsoever 
to make any appropriation of water in accordance 'vith 
tl1e laws of this State. 
Point :No. 8 
THE DECLARED PURPOSE IN EACH OF THE APPLI-
CATIONS FILED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
IS SHOWN TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO PREEMPT THE 
WATER, TO GAIN A MONOPOLY AND TO CONTROL 
OTHER LANDS OF PRIVATE CITIZENS AND TO "REGU-
LATE" THE PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS, AND SUCH PUR-
POSES ARE FOR THE DOMINATION OF THE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS OF OTHERS AND NOT FOR THE APPLICATION 
OF WATER TO BENEFICIAL USE BY THE LANDOWNER 
OR APPLICANT. 
At the hearing on September 13, 1952, counsel for 
the governinent stated for the record "that the whole 
purpose of the United States and the agencies actively 
making claims to water" in this case is "entirely for the 
benefit of permittees and other grantees to graze on the 
public lands." (R. 51). Such statement is incorrect, for 
as indicated by counsel, the permittees might change, 
and the government does not want any permittee "to 
obtain pennanent rights in the water." The whole pur-
pose of the applications was to obtain control of the 
water and to pree1npt the water from further filing by 
the livestock operators. As indicated at the hearing, 
each application filed by the government contains. the 
following declaration (R. 52) : 
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"The purpose of the appropriation is to pro-
vide water for livestock using the surrounding 
federal range and to conserve and regulate the 
public grazing lands to stabilize the livestock 
industry dependent on them and in aid thereof 
to promote proper use of the privately controlled 
lands and water dependent upon the puhlic 
grazing lands. 
"The quantity of water sought to be appro-
priated is limited to that which can be beneficiallY 
used by the persons herein described." · 
Thus, the only persons who would beneficially use 
the water would be the permittees, and the government 
does not propose that any water rights shall be acquired 
by them, although the permittees will make the appro-
priation of water for beneficial use. Furthermore, the 
declaration shows a design to pre-empt th~ water from 
further filing by livestock operators, and to ve~t the 
control of the water in the government, although the 
governinent itself makes no use of the water. One of 
the avowed purposes is "to conserve and regulate the 
public grazing lands to stabilize the liTestock ind11sfry 
dependent on them and in aid thereof to promote propl'r 
usc of the privately controlled la,nds and wnfet· depenrlent 
upon the public grazing lands." 
No better statement could be made of an intention 
to control and monopolize the water by a nonappropri-
ator of \Yater in order to regulate the aetivities of the 
appropriators and their husinP~~. Section 100-3-8, V. C. 
A. lf)-t-:i, Section 7:~-:3-.'-i, U. C. A. 1953, authorizes approval 
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of an application by the State Engineer only if ''the 
application was filed in good faith and not for purpo~P~ 
of speculation or rnonopoly, ·· and other essential facts 
exist. 
Here, the governrnent proposes to dominate and to 
control privately owned property through application~ 
for appropriation, without any intention to actually 
·utilize the water. A new theory of water rights '<\·a.s 
manifested in the clain1 of diligence rights whereby the 
landowner would acquire duplicate water right~ based 
on the appropriations of water for beneficial use rnade 
on such land by livestock operators not in privity with 
the landowner. K ow we have still another theory that 
the landowner can pre-en1pt the water which arises on 
his land, without any intention himself to appropriate 
the water to beneficial use, but by permitting others to 
come upon his land and apply the water to beneficial use. 
Furthermore, there is irnplicit in such declaration an 
attempt to gain control over privately owned lands and 
water rights, which spells out clearly a n1onopolistic 
purpose interdicted by our water la-w. The whole pur-
pose is in derrogation of the rule that beneficial use 
shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights 
to the use of water in this State. 
We contend that the applications are void on their 
face, as an attempt to circmnvent the law. It is well 
known, that when an agen~y of government is invested 
with power, it seldom exercises less po~er than it 
acquires. To permit the approval of such void applica-
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tions, and to give them judicial status in the general 
adjudication decree, is to sanction the declared purposes 
which are contrary to law, and which would operate to 
circumvent and destroy our entire law of bBneficial use. 
\Ve further contend that the trial court should have 
adjudged those applications, and each of them, to be void. 
Point No. 9 
THE STIPULATION SHOWS THAT SOME OF THE 
APPLICATIONS LAPSED OR WERE WITHDRAWN, AND 
THAT WHERE CERTIFICATES OF APPROPRIATION 
WERE ISSUED SUCH PROOF WAS FALSE AND THAT NO 
WATER HAS EVER BEEN PUT TO BENEFICIAL USE, SO 
THAT THERE ARE NO EXISTING RIGHTS TO THE USE 
OF WATER AND NO BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER BEING 
MADE UPON WHICH ANY ADJUDICATION CAN BE MADE 
IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
It is true that in the findings of fact, paragraph 1, 
there are set out the numbers of applications which 
were not withdrawn and which had not formally lapsed; 
but by the terms of the interlocutor:- decr<'r, the court 
did not li1nit approval to those particular application~, 
but dismissed all of the objections. The court did not 
even sustain the objections a:;; to the applications whi(·h 
the governrnent admitted h~' paragraph 7 of the Rtipula-
tion were withdrawn or had lapsed. 
It is clear that as to those applications on whi(·h 
certificates were issued, the stipulation shows that there 
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,, has never been any appropriation of water to bPnt~fieial 
use bY the o·ovenuuent and those claims should hP 
• b ' 
adjudged void. ~-\s to the diligenee right8 elaim~, the~· 
likewise were void. ~-\8 to the balance of the applications 
which were not withdrawn, the applications manifP~t a 
purpose contrary to the laws of this State. The stipu-
lation sho,,·s on its face that the govern1nent is not an 
appropriator of water, it has never been and it does 
not propose to 1nake any appropriation whatsoever. The 
stipulation has the force of conclusive evidence. 
Consequently, there are no existing water rights 
nor any valid pending applications which could be 
adjudicated in favor of the united States of America. 
\Ve contend that the record requires a finding that 
all of the claims of the L"nited States were and are 
invalid. The findings of fact do not cover the admitted 
facts at all, and the interlocutory decree erroneously 
dismisses the objections of appellants, when the decree 
should grant the motion of appellants to strike each and 
every one of the claims of the United States from the 
Proposed Determination. 
Appellants respectfully request this Honorable 
Court to reverse the interlocutory decree and order 
entry of a decree to the effect that all of the claims of 
the United States of America, were and are void, and 
also order the elimination of each of said claims from 
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the Proposed Determination of the State Engineer in 
nmking the final decree. 
Respectfully submitted, 
:McKAY, BURTON, ~lc~liLLAN 
& RICHARDS, 
PAUL E. REI.MANN, and 
MILTON A. O:MAK, 
Attorneys for Objectors and 
.A[Jpellants. 
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